A Regulatory Awakening: The FTC’s SPARTA Inquiry into College Sports Agent Compliance

By Olivia Jaffe*                                                                                  Posted: 02/27/2026

SPARTA & Renewed Federal Attention

Since Congress enacted the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (“SPARTA”) in 2004, federal regulators have undertaken limited enforcement of the statute.[1]  The federal consumer protection statute was intended to safeguard student-athletes from deceptive or coercive agent practices by making a regulatory framework enforceable under the Federal Trade Commission Act.[2]  In January 2026, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued inquiry letters to twenty Division I institutions requesting information concerning athlete representation agreements, agent conduct, and related compliance practices.[3]  Through these inquiries, the FTC has reignited federal scrutiny into SPARTA compliance and signaled a reassertion of its oversight role after decades of limited enforcement.[4]

SPARTA was designed to impose enforceable obligations on sports agents who recruit and represent student-athletes.[5]  The statute requires that agents provide written disclosures to prospective student-athletes prior to entering into representation agreements, including warnings about the potential impacts of such agreements on NCAA eligibility.[6]  SPARTA also prohibits agents from providing or offering anything of value to induce student-athletes or their family members to enter into representation agreements.[7]  In addition, the statute imposes recordkeeping and notice requirements to promote accountability.[8]  The federal law treats violations of SPARTA provisions as unfair or deceptive acts or practices under federal law.[9]  Although lawmakers enacted SPARTA with laudable objectives, regulators have made little effort to enforce the legislation and have offered minimal justification for failing to do so since its passage.[10]

As a result of SPARTA’s enforcement dormancy, state legislatures assumed primary responsibility for regulating athlete agents and protecting student-athletes.[11]  Many states have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”) or the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”) to establish consistent standards to govern disclosures and conduct.[12]  These statutes require agents to register with state authorities, prohibit improper inducements, mandate disclosures to student-athletes, and obligate agents to notify educational institutions when representation agreements take effect.[13]  Since its enactment, the UAAA framework has provided a uniform layer of protection for student-athletes and institutions during prolonged periods of federal inaction. These frameworks are especially important as the rapid expansion of the name, image, and likeness (NIL) marketplace has increased the role of agents in negotiating and managing student-athlete commercial opportunities.[14]  As student-athletes increasingly engage in high-value endorsements and licensing agreements, the incentives for agent misconduct, particularly through improper inducements or inadequate disclosures, have grown correspondingly.[15]  These developments have increased the relevance of SPARTA’s protection objectives and drawn attention to the federal enforcement gap since the statute’s enactment.[16]

The FTC’s Inquiry and Potential Heightened Enforcement

The FTC’s recent inquiry letters request information regarding compliance with SPARTA’s disclosure and notice requirements.[17]  Specifically, the agency requested (1) the dates on which athlete agents notified the institutions that a student-athlete had entered an agency agreement, (2) the name of the agent, and (3) whether institutions have received complaints or reports concerning an athlete agent’s relationship with a student-athlete.[18]  The FTC’s inquiry reflects an effort to assess how agents and institutions apply SPARTA’s requirements and whether the statute’s disclosure, notification, and conduct requirements provide an effective accountability mechanism in the regulation of agent conduct in the context of NIL activities.[19]  However, the effectiveness of these legal requirements depends on their consistent enforcement, which as previously mentioned, has been absent since SPARTA’s enactment.[20]  As the FTC undergoes a structural and ideological overhaul under the Trump administration, student-athletes may be among the first to recognize whether this shift represents meaningful regulatory reform or a transient demonstration of executive and regulatory attention.[21]

With the explosion of NIL opportunities for student-athletes, there is a critical tension in college athletics between empowering student-athletes to secure representation and safeguarding them from exploitative actors.[22]  The federal government recognizes this, but its use of the information it gathers will be a litmus test for whether federal oversight is a genuine initiative or if state protection is the sole active regulator.[23]  This moment represents a pivotal opportunity for the FTC that could redefine federal oversight of athlete representation in an era of NIL opportunities.[24]

*Staff Writer, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, J.D. Candidate, May 2027, Villanova University Charles Widg

[1] See Callan G. Stein, Michael S. Lowe, Christopher M. Brolley & Derek Centola, This Is SPARTA: The FTC’s Formal Inquiry and a Sea Change in Federal Oversight of College Sports Agents, Troutman Pepper Locke: NIL Revolution (Jan. 15, 2026) https://www.nilrevolution.com/2026/01/this-is-sparta-the-ftcs-formal-inquiry-and-a-sea-change-in-federal-oversight-of-college-sports-agents/ (discussing decades of minimal federal enforcement of SPARTA and abrupt reentrance of SPARTA in college sports).

[2] See FTC Is Seeking Information from 20 Universities on Sports Agents’ Compliance with Law Aimed at Protecting Student Athletes, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Jan. 12, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/01/ftc-seeking-information-20-universities-sports-agents-compliance-law-aimed-protecting-student [hereinafter Inquiry Letters] (seeking information from twenty universities about “whether sports agents who work with student-athletes have complied with requirements” of SPARTA, which requires specific disclosures to student-athletes and notice to schools).

[3] See id. (requesting date(s) when athlete agents notified schools that student-athlete entered agency contract, name of agent, and whether schools received complaints or reports about athlete agent’s relationship with student-athlete).

[4] See Stein et al., supra note 1 (describing potential material effect on agents, institutions, and student-athletes navigating NIL marketplace).

[5] See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807 (2018) (outlining prohibited conduct and regulation of unfair or deceptive practices in connection with contact between athlete agent and student-athlete).

[6]  See id. (prohibiting athlete agents from entering into “agency contract with a student-athlete without providing the student-athlete with the disclosure document”).

[7] See id. (stating “it is unlawful for an athlete agent to directly or indirectly recruit or solicit a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract, by providing anything of value to a student-athlete or anyone associated with the student-athlete before the student-athlete enters into an agency contract, including any consideration in the form of a loan, or acting in the capacity of a guarantor or co-guarantor for any debt”).

[8] See id. (stating “the disclosure document must contain . . . a conspicuous notice in boldface type stating: “Warning to Student Athlete: If you agree orally or in writing to be represented by an agent now or in the future you may lose your eligibility to compete as a student athlete in your sport.  Within 72 hours after entering into this contract or before the next athletic event in which you are eligible to participate, whichever occurs first, both you and the agent by whom you are agreeing to be represented must notify the athletic director of the educational institution at which you are enrolled, or other individual responsible for athletic programs at such educational institution, that you have entered into an agency contract.”).

[9]  See id. (identifying unlawful conduct as unfair and deceptive).

[10] For further discussion on SPARTA’s dormancy, see infra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.

[11] See Stein et al., supra note 1 (explaining “SPARTA enforcement has taken a back seat to state athlete-agent statutes, including the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) and Revised UAAA, which impose licensing and registration requirements and are enforced more routinely at the state level”).

[12] See Athlete Agents Act, Unif. L. Comm’n, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=cef8ae71-2f7b-4404-9af5-309bb70e861e (last visited Feb. 8, 2026) (reporting UAAA adoption in forty-two U.S. states and UAAA’s role governing relations among student-athletes, athlete agents, and institutions).

[13] See id. (addressing unethical agent behavior, especially in cases where athlete is not aware of possible effect of signing agency agreement or where agency established without notice to athletic director of institution).

[14] See Nick Georgelis, The Rise of NIL and Rights of Publicity, JurisMagazine (Nov. 15, 2023) https://sites.law.duq.edu/juris/2023/11/15/the-rise-of-nil-and-rights-of-publicity/ (reporting rise of NIL rights and potential for student-athletes to earn millions in legal profit from name, image, and likeness).

[15] See David A. McCarville & K.J. Russell, NIL Agents: The Good, the Bad, and the Unregulated, Fennemore (Mar. 4, 2025) https://www.fennemorelaw.com/nil-agents-the-good-the-bad-and-the-unregulated/ (explaining “without a thorough understanding of contract negotiation, financial management, brand strategy, and more, NIL agents may lock athletes into exploitative contracts, mismanage funds, or even damage the student-athlete’s brand through poor representation choices”).

[16] See Stein et al., supra note 1 (describing SPARTA’s design to protect student-athletes under federal consumer protection law).

[17] See Inquiry Letters, supra note 2 (requesting responses from institutions by March 23, 2026).

[18] See id. (requesting comprehensive information regarding athlete agent conduct with student-athletes).

[19] See id. (requesting further reports from “student athletes, parents, or schools who have concerns about matters related to sports agents and agents’ compliance with SPARTA”).

[20] See Michael McCann, FTC Revives Overlooked Law to Police College Sports Agents, Sportico (Jan. 22, 2026) https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2026/ftc-college-athlete-sports-agents-sparta-1234881991/ (stating “on rare occasions over the last two decades, SPARTA has been referenced in amicus briefs—which are advocacy documents by parties not in a case—and assorted litigation exhibits usually not central to a dispute.  It’s reasonable to say SPARTA has been largely inconsequential in practice.”).

[21] See Lisa Wiznitzer, FTC Puts Student-Athlete Representation Back in the Spotlight, JDSUPRA (Jan. 16, 2026) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-puts-student-athlete-representation-1966105/ (describing new complex regulatory environment and civil penalties for violations of SPARTA).

[22] See id. (describing unique position of college athletes who are not recognized as employees, and therefore cannot operate as bargaining units, but require some form of protection from predatory actors).

[23] See id. (adding that according to LexisNexis and Westlaw, SPARTA has never appeared in court ruling, and similar search of FTC warning letters reveal zero reference to possible SPARTA violations).

[24] See Adam I. Dale, Robert Pannullo & Andrew King, Sports Agents Under a Microscope? The FTC Signals Potential Enforcement of Long-Dormant Sports Agent Law, Winston & Strawn (Jan. 22, 2026), https://www.winston.com/en/insights-news/sports-agents-under-a-microscope-the-ftc-signals-potential-enforcement-of-long-dormant-sports-agent-law (reporting “the FTC’s renewed interest in SPARTA may spark state regulators to renew their interest in their respective sports agent laws”).